ABSTRACT. We present a new algorithm for a decision problem if two Latin squares are isotopic. Our modification has the same complexity as Miller's algorithm, but in many practical situations is much faster. Based on our results we study also a zero-knowledge protocol suggested in [3] . From our results it follows that there are some problems in practical application of this protocol.
Introduction
Throughout this paper we use a common notation for the symmetric group of elements from a set X as Sym(X). Especially, the symmetric group over the symbol set I n = {1, . . . , n} will be denoted by S n . Also L(n) will denote the set of all Latin squares over I n . We will understand the Cayley table of a quasigroup (S, * ) over the symbol set I n as a Latin square L = L( ij ) ∈ L(n) with ij = i * j. Therefore the notions of a quasigroup and a Latin square will be freely interchanged in the paper. Since it is more natural and handy to express definitions and results concerning the topic in the language of Latin squares, the notion of a quasigroup will be used only sporadically.
A Latin square was regarded by Euler as a square matrix with n 2 entries of n different elements, none of them occurring twice within any row or column of the matrix: that (quote [12] ) ". . . various algebraic structures can be used for ciphering". The first serious usage of Latin squares in Block ciphers with detailed analysis is connected with the cipher IDEA [14] . In this paper authors used the concept of non-isotopic quasigroups. Since that time plenty of papers has been published, some of them are mentioned in [19] . It is customary to mention
• Block ciphers ( L a i, M a s s e y IDEA 1990, [14] ).
• (Almost) public key cryptography ( K o s c i e l n y and M u l l e n 1999 [13] , M a r k o v s k i, G l i g o r o s k i, S t o j c e v s k a 2000 [15] ).
• S-box theory ( G r oš e k, S a t k o, N e m o g a 2000 [9] , [10] , G r oš e k, H o rá k, T r a n 2004 [11] ). [7] ).
From such a brief list one can see a large potential of Latin squares for cryptography along with their analysis as a part of cryptanalysis. One of the basic properties of Latin squares is their membership to an isotopy class. These are precisely Latin squares which differ in the row, column or element permutation, respectively. We say that they are in some sense similar. Such Latin squares are used in the stream cipher EDON 80, and in [22] authors analyzed the influence of isotopic Latin squares to the security of this cipher. Their analysis by exhaustive search was possible because of the small size of them, namely 4 × 4. Nowadays ciphers, like EdonR [7] which is a candidate for the new standard SHA3, use much larger quasigroups. Thus a natural task arises: to develop a strong toolkit for the decision problem if two Latin squares are isotopic.
In M i l l e r' s paper [16] one can find an O(n log 2 n ) algorithm based on a previous work of T a r j a n [17] . Obviously this algorithm is impossible to use for EdonR analysis. In some other papers authors used a graph representation of Latin squares, and the problem is converted to finding isomorphisms of strongly regular graphs. Complexity of such algorithms is of the order O(n n 1/3 log 2 n ), and hence they are, in general, slower than Miller's algorithm.
Isotopy problem of two Latin squares
For convenience of a reader we briefly recall some basic definitions. 
Isotopy is an important relation on the set of Latin squares. Even more this is an equivalence relation which divides L n on disjoint classes of isotopic squares. And we have a decision problem INPUT: Latin squares L, M of order n.
DECISION: Are they isotopic?
OUTPUT: YES -NO.
To solve this problem doest not require, in general, to find permutation of rows θ, columns ϕ and symbols ψ if they are isotopic. One such approach is due to F e r g u s o n [4] which was shown as wrong in [5] . An informal description is as follows:
• Let E be the equivalence relation on L n in which L and M, or transpose of M, M t are isotopic.
• One can assume a Latin square as n × n matrix, and calculate its determinant.
• It has been shown in [4] that L and M , n ≤ 7, are isotopic iff they have the same determinant.
• This result is not true for n = 8 as shown in [5] .
One of the first attempts to use isotopy to evaluate security of a cryptographic system was paper [22] . EDON80, as one of the submissions to the ECRYPT Stream Ciphers Project-eSTREAM that passed to the Phase II, uses so called e-transformers. They consist of four quasigroups of order n = 4 in each e-transformer (out of 64 carefully chosen), selected to use by 80 bits key read as two-bits sequences 00, 01, 10, 11. V o j v o d a and Sý s presented at SASC '07 in Bochum that all 64 are isotopic to (Z 4 , +). Moreover, they are polynomial [11] over GF (2 2 ). If L, M are isotopic and L is polynomial, then M is polynomial. Thus one polynomial is enough to describe e-transformers. These two facts may imply a possible weakness, or simplification in hardware.
Another possibility is to use isotopy for a cryptographic primitive. It is known that isotopy problem belongs to the "hard problems" [16] . As we mentioned above the complexity by Miller's algorithm is O(n log 2 n ). Thus this problem can be (potentially) used in zero-knowledge protocols by Goldreich, Micali, Wigderson theorem which states that all NP problems give to rise to a zero-knowledge proofs.
Ì ÓÖ Ñ 1 (G o l d r e i c h-M i c a l i-W i g d e r s o n [8])º Every provable mathematical statement has a zero-knowledge proof.
We focus on this problem in the Section 4.
A new algorithm for isotopy
A well known Cayley theorem [18] states that any group (G, * ) is isomorphic to a subgroup G of the symmetric group Sym(G). This isomorphism is known as a regular representation of G. Elements of G can be represented by left trans-
For a quasigroup Q we can similarly consider the set of left translations although in this case L Q is not the isomorphic image of Q. The quasigroup is defined by L Q uniquely. Next theorem states relation between translations and isotopy of two quasigroups.
Ì ÓÖ Ñ 2º Let (θ, ϕ, ψ) be isotopism of two quasigroups Q 1 = (Q, * 1 ) and
From Theorem 2 we have a straightforward method how to find an isotopism for two quasigroups Q 1 , Q 2 : For all ϕ, ψ ∈ Sym(Q) verify (1). This approach has obviously a very high complexity. The next theorem is more practical for such purposes.
An algorithm based on Theorem 3 is much more effective than that based on Theorem 2. It is enough to find for a fixed
are conjugate by p, and thus they possess the same cycle structure. This fact allows to modify the set of permutations p from the search space. The cycle structure of g, h ∈ S n directly leads to the set C n (g, h) = {p| pgp −1 = h}. The cardinality of this set is given by the structure
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of permutations g, h. The cycle structure of p ∈ S n is a vector of the numbers (a 1 , · · · , a n ), of disjoint cycles of p. More precisely, p possesses a i cycles of the length i. For two conjugate permutations g, h, of the type (a 1 , · · · , a n ) we have [21] 
Another improvement for the isotopy algorithm is based on generators for the conjugate sets G, H ⊆ S n with C n (G, H) = {p| pGp −1 = H}.
exists a sequence of permutations {g n } k j=1 from G such that for the permutation τ = k j=1 g j .
A pseudocode of the algorithm to find C n (G, H) is as follows:
(1) Divide g i ∈ G to cycles and find the smallest set G = {g 1 
(2) Divide to cycles permutations h i ∈ H.
(3) For each m-subset H of h 1 , · · · , h m such that H is of the same type as G , and H generates H do:
(a) for each P j ∈ I m such that g i and h P j (i) are of the same type, find p ∈ S n such that pG p
We will use Algorithm 1 in the next one to find for two quasigroups G, H the set of their isotopisms Is(G, H). To speed up this algorithm there was proven in [21] a new necessary condition for the existence of an isotopism. The condition is based on Theorem 4 and its Corollary. Then we say that Q, * (i,j,k) are conjugate with (Q, * ).
Recall that all such quasigroups Q, * (i,j,k) are also conjugate each other, and thus this is an equivalence relation on L n .
Ì ÓÖ Ñ 4º Let
, respectively.
ÓÖÓÐÐ ÖÝ 5º Let Q = (Q, * ) be a quasigroup of order n. For conjugate quasi-
contain the same number of permutations with the same cyclic structure, i.e., are of the same type.
Finally, using the necessary condition in the Algorithm 1 we get our new algorithm for finding isotopisms of two quasigroups.
Ð ÓÖ Ø Ñ 2º Input: Quasigroups G, H of order n. Output: The set of their isotopisms Is(G, H).
(1) Find conjugate quasigroups 1,3) , G 3 = G (3, 1, 2) and
(2) Find permutations
are of the same type for all i, j ∈ I n × I 3 . If such a triplet does not exist, then Stop algorithm and Return Is(G, H) = ∅.
(4) Return Is(G, H).
This algorithm has the same worst case complexity O(n log 2 n ) as the Miller's algorithm [16] . Our contribution is in the step with necessary condition step (2) which can distinguish non isotopic quasigroups of order n ≤ 8 in majority cases.
Probability for non isotopic quasigroups to pass step (2) is for orders 6, 7, 8 lower than 4.3 * 10 −3 , 3.15 * 10 −5 , 3.0 * 10 −10 , respectively. If this was the case for higher orders, too, then we would have a very strong probabilistic toolkit to verify isotopy of two Latin squares. Its complexity is O(n 3 ) only, and thus for quasigroups of order n > 9 would be faster than Miller's algorithm.
Based on our algorithm we can sharpen estimation of S a d e [20] for the cardinality of autotopisms AU T (Q) of a quasigroup Q, which is n × n!. 
Ì ÓÖ Ñ 6º
For n odd, except of n = 9,
For n = 9 we have |Aut(Q)| ≤ 9(9 − 1)3!3 3 = 11664.
Zero knowledge protocol and isotopy
As we mentioned above due to theorem Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson any hard problem can be used in zero-knowledge protocols. Probably, led by this idea, authors of [3] published their zero-knowledge protocol. In the protocol we have two participants u i , u j , and public as well as secret parameters distributed as follows:
• Public parameters of u i : isotopic Latin squares L, L .
• Secret parameters of u i : I = (θ i , ϕ i , ψ i ).
• Aim of u i : to prove u j knowledge of I without revealing I itself.
The Protocol is based on public keys L, L and a secret key I = (θ i , ϕ i , ψ i ), respectively. Realization of the protocol supposes the following steps:
(1) u i randomly permutes L to produce another Latin square, say H.
(3) u j asks u i either to:
• prove that H, L are isotopic;
• prove that H, L are isotopic.
(4) u i complies. He either • proves that H, L are isotopic;
• proves that H, L are isotopic.
(5) u i , u j repeat n-times steps (1)- (4) if necessary (i.e., a new H is generated).
In view of our new Algorithm 2, or Miller's algorithm we performed an experiment. To do this we used an equivalent definition of a quasigroup (Q, * ): Ò Ø ÓÒ 5º Let (Q, * ) be a set with binary operation satisfying the following conditions: for any a, b ∈ Q there is a unique solution of the following equations
Then (Q, * ) is a quasigroup.
This definition leads to a construction of the set of generators of Q. Informally, we can start with two elements of Q, and construct more and more elements x i by the following iteration: {a, b} → {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 } ∪ {a, b} → . . . This leads to the definition.
Then we call G the set of generators for Q.
Next we recall informally a variation of Miller's Algorithm (or our new algorithm) with generators.
(1) Find generators
(3) If YES, then they are isotopic, otherwise NOT. Clearly, the complexity of this variation heavily depends on the size of the set of generators of Q 1 . M i l l e r [16] proved that |G| ≤ log 2 n, and this bound appears in the complexity of his algorithm. Thus a natural question arise: What is the number m i of non-isotopic quasigroups with |G| = i? From our exhaustive computer search for 2 ≤ n ≤ 8 we get the results aggregated in the Table 1 . • There is a limited number of quasigroups with |G| > 1;
• For majority of quasigroups complexity of the algorithm is O n |G|+o(1) ≈ O n 1+o(1) .
Thus the above mentioned protocol for majority of quasigroups probably faces serious problems.
Conclusions
We presented a new algorithm for solving isotopy problem which is of the same worst case complexity as Miller's algorithm but in many practical situations it is much more faster. We also discuss the zero-knowledge protocol introduced in [3] . There are some practical considerations for this protocol in our results.
• The size of the quasigroup Q cannot be too large since (θ i , ϕ i , ψ i ) has to be sent during the protocol; • Thus our aim is to find a relatively small Q with a large set of generators G.
For really "small" n we can use a computer search. But then the protocol is weak; • Random search is very impractical (see Table 1 ). For special quasigroups, like Q = Z n 2 we have fast algorithms. The same is true for any group. Thus we conclude that an applicability of the protocol is really in question.
